Introduction
============

The strength depletion model of self-control ([@B2]) proposes that people have a limited capacity for self-regulation, and this capacity fluctuates due to circumstances and resources. After resisting some temptations or stifling some emotions, the capacity may be reduced. Laboratory experiments have tested this idea by showing that after people exert self-regulation on one task or in one context, their performance on a second, seemingly unrelated self-control task is impaired. A large volume of published studies has demonstrated this pattern with many different procedures and laboratories, as confirmed by meta-analysis ([@B22]).

A contrary conclusion was recently asserted by [@B6]. They conducted a meta-analysis on a small portion of the literature. The second part of [@B6] title makes the sweeping assertion: "Self-Control Does Not Seem to Rely on a Limited Resource." That claim is consistent with their previously avowed skepticism about ego depletion ([@B7],[@B8], [@B9]). In this article, we elucidate why their conclusion seems wrong.

Nothing or Something?
=====================

[@B6] conclusion that there is no evidence for an ego depletion effect is sharply at odds with the meta-analysis by [@B22]. [@B6] criticize [@B22] for including only published studies. Published studies have the virtue of the methodological and interpretational quality control that comes from peer review, which can be sorely lacking in unpublished reports. But, the preference for significant results in the publication process can exert a bias in a meta-analytic sample ([@B19]; [@B37]). As we shall note, however, [@B6] discarded most of the relevant published literature and replaced it with other work, emphasizing a set of unpublished studies from a small group of investigators. One can readily assume that such a practice will diminish an effect. Even so, what [@B6] found was not substantially different. [@B22] meta-analysis of *k* = 198 published experiments with 10,782 participants concluded that: "the depletion effect is real, robust to experimental context, and, in terms of a standardized mean difference (i.e., Cohen's *d*), of medium-to-large magnitude: *d* = 0.62" (CI~0.95~ \[0.57--0.67\], p. 508). [@B6] broadest analysis yielded a supportive *g* = 0.43 (CI~0.95~ \[0.34--0.52\]) in favor of a medium-sized ego depletion effect in their sample of studies. Hedge's g is akin to Cohen's *d*, and corrects for small sample effects, so it is appropriate to compare the numbers ([@B24]). Thus, while the smaller [@B6] sample produced an effect size that was less than the lower bounds of the [@B22] confidence interval, the two very different meta-analyses yielded fairly comparable effect sizes that were consistent with the strength depletion model.

The [@B22] estimate may be high because of publication bias and the [@B6] estimate may be low because of their favoring of studies with methodological limitations, as will be described below. Nonetheless, both meta-analyses point to conclusions that are contrary to the [@B6] subtitle, namely that there is evidence in favor of the self-control depletion effect.

Moreover, the directionality of the findings aggregated by [@B6] is inconsistent with their apparent acceptance of the null hypothesis. If the true effect of ego depletion procedures were zero, then all the significant findings represent capitalizing on chance. Chance works both ways, so about half the time ego depletion should produce better performance, half the time worse (apart from some no-difference findings; [@B21]). [@B6] found that in 76% of the studies having a *g* larger than 0.10, the direction was consistent with ego depletion --- and a tiny 10% in the other direction. The rest were the essentially no-difference effects, -0.10 \< g \< +0.10. These tallies include non-significant findings. [@B6] did not report how many of these were significant, but it seems likely that most if not all of the reverse-direction findings were non-significant, and reasonably attributable to chance.

As far as we can ascertain, the published literature contains hardly any findings that indicate significant improvement in self-regulatory performance following an ego depletion procedure. Such findings would presumably get high priority for publication. The handful that have been published (e.g., [@B1]; [@B13]; [@B7]; [@B44]) reflect highly unusual, specifically designed circumstances. For example, [@B13] found that leaders often disdained low-level work, but when they were depleted, they ceased to assess whether tasks were suitable for them and simply did their best on everything, resulting in an improvement compared to non-depleted leaders. This is not a finding that contradicts ego depletion, but rather it reflects another form that ego depletion can take, namely skimping on non-essential cognitive work (pre-performance assessment).

The substantial absence of published evidence for significant improvements in self-regulatory performance after ego depletion stands in sharp contrast to the 100s of findings of significant decrements. It renders highly implausible the conclusion that the true effect is zero.

We hasten to add that the volume of supportive findings does not prove that the strength or limited model is correct. Our point is simply that there is a genuine phenomenon. Competing models have been proposed (e.g., [@B28]). There seems ample room to debate exactly what the process is that produces these effects. But debating whether there is any effect at all seems unwarranted at this point.

Excluding Published Evidence
============================

How, then, did [@B6] get from the literature's robust overall support for ego depletion to their conclusion that there is not an effect? Explication of [@B6] questionable decisions can provide instructive lessons for future investigators, meta-analysts, journal reviewers and authors.

We had serious concerns about the study sampling procedures used by [@B6]. As noted above, [@B6] excluded most of the published literature. They said that they found 620 experiments on depletion, yet their largest meta-analysis included only 116 of these, with 118 effects. Although the exclusion criteria were described, how they got from 620 to 118 effects is not completely transparent. Ideally, two or more unbiased raters should each make exclusion decisions independently, with high inter-rater reliability, but that was not reported by [@B6]. Only 28 of the 198 experiments included in [@B22] meta-analysis survived [@B6] idiosyncratic sampling to merit inclusion. The high rate of exclusion was explained based on [@B6] intention to do mini-meta-analyses on specific ego-depletion procedures, so only studies that fit into their eight narrow procedural categories were included. Yet, that justification is questionable because their analyses never focused on the suitability of each procedures as an operationalization of depletion, as will be described below, whereas they offered a sweeping negative conclusion about the depletion effect as a whole, including in their title.

[@B6] stated objections about much of the literature are unconvincing. Take, for example, their complaint about findings showing that both more ([@B31]) and less prosociality (e.g., [@B12]) can be taken as signs of ego depletion. Depleted subjects often comply more than control participants with requests for help ([@B31]; [@B18]). Yet selfish motivations, which mitigate against helping, also were found to increase among depleted persons ([@B12]). Although the outcomes point in different directions, the underlying mechanism of failing to inhibit impulses is the same. Indeed, one research team demonstrated both effects, which systematically varied overriding impulses or incipient urges, so that donating more or less can both reflect failure to restrain impulses. They stimulated impulses to be generous by exposing participants to prosocial situational cues, and found that those cues elicited more prosocial action as a function of the situation structure ([@B23]). Such work illuminates process and builds theory. Ignoring viable findings underestimates the empirical support for the theory that is supposedly being evaluated.

The Sampling of Unpublished Reports
===================================

[@B6] stated that they went to some lengths to locate unpublished reports. Published experiments comprised 66.3% (411/620) of their population of studies and unpublished studies comprised 33.7%. (209/620), but the true proportion may be different. The meta-analysts counted a study as published if it was "in peer-reviewed journals, in press, under review, or being sent in for review" (p. 800). Clearly, that procedure mistakenly counts some unpublished studies as published (cf. [@B10]; [@B20]). In the final sample decided by their inclusion criteria, however, published effects were underrepresented by 8.7%, comprising 57.6% (68/118) of the final sample, whereas unpublished effects were over-represented at more than 42.2% (50/118).

The overrepresentation of unpublished tests of depletion in the [@B6] meta-analysis sample compared to the population of studies was significant (*z* = 1.79, *p* \< 0.04, one tail). Regrettably, [@B6] did not report the magnitude of the effect sizes for all 620 studies. They did, however, report that "published" studies in their small and idiosyncratic sample tended to have larger effects than unpublished studies (*b* = 0.18, *p* \< 0.06, Table 4). Thus, because unpublished studies tended to have smaller effect sizes, including them disproportionately may tend to bias the meta-analytic outcome.

Even so, the unpublished studies were not randomly distributed, as one would expect if they consisted of reports of competent studies testing a false hypothesis ([@B21]). Inspection of the effect sizes in [@B6] Table 1, and counting only the unpublished studies, reveals that 75.5% are in the predicted positive direction and only 24.5% (12/49) of the unpublished studies are in the contrary direction (and most of the latter are non-significant). The difference in direction of effects is highly significant (*z* = 3.43, *p* \< 0.001), and suggests that the unpublished literature does not consist of a large number of counter-theoretical outcomes, as would be expected if the self-regulation depletion model was spurious. Thus, the aggregate of unpublished studies from the file drawers adds up to weak evidence in favor ego depletion, rather than indicating a large body of genuinely null or contrary findings. This is what one would expect if many unpublished studies with weak or null results failed because of inappropriate calibration, low power, and other missteps by the experimenters.

Methodological Quality and Null Findings
========================================

The authority and insight of meta-analysis come from combining results from as many studies as possible and coding them by methodological quality and characteristics. For example, [@B42] meta-analysis of 127 studies of fear appeals coded for a dozen moderators. [@B20] meta-analysis of 355 studies of narcissism separately coded for five publication types and five sample types. Meta-analyses that fail to include such codes, or that omit much of the literature, lose this advantage. Research synthesists also recommend that each predictor or outcome measure should be examined for the degree to which it operationalizes the constructs of interest (e.g., [@B10]). Regrettably, [@B6] did not code studies based on the quality of the methodology or determine if there were appropriately operationalized constructs that provided a genuine test of the depletion hypothesis.

The recent crisis in social psychology over replicability of findings is partly based on the assumption that the same procedures should yield the same effects on anyone, anywhere, and anytime. We think this assumption is generally false. For many psychological phenomena, manipulations and measures often need to be calibrated to the participant population being tested. For example, a bowl of delicious chocolates may not have the same motivational impact on a research participant who has just had a big lunch compared to a dieting participant who skipped lunch ([@B35]).

This simple truth is often overlooked. [@B6] criticized the magnitude of effects obtained with anagrams--- but anagrams can be so simple that everyone can solve them, or so difficult that no one can. Crucially, the appropriate "sweet spot" level of difficulty is different for different groups, as one of us can attest based on having collected data both at a very selective Ivy League university and a not-very-selective state university. Quite simply, a participant who is already unable to solve an anagram such as ELOTME^[1](#fn01){ref-type="fn"}^ will not show any decline in performance due to ego depletion, even if ego depletion makes him or her less able to solve anagrams. Null results based on anagrams that are too hard or too easy for a local population are not failures to replicate (though [@B6] would count them as such). Rather, they are failures to properly operationalize and test the hypothesis.

In general, an effective ego depletion operationalization will include an initial task that is sufficiently mentally fatiguing that it degrades cognitive resources, but is not so personally relevant, interesting or challenging that it activates energy reserves. A second task indicative of self-regulation should be presented promptly, before the participant recovers, without a rest period or other procedures, such as several self-report measures. The second task must be based on a strong habit that must be over-ridden through impulse control, such as the Stroop test, refraining from snacking, or solving scrambled words. Thus, the outcome task must require some self-regulatory effort, but also affords the opportunity for participants to slack off without self-awareness or the loss of external incentives, including experimenter approval. A skeptical, distracted, or disinterested (or just absent) experimenter may alter the motivational dynamics of the situation. Pilot-testing with manipulation checks and thorough debriefing should be mandatory before a full study is executed. Purely cognitive tasks that do not involve a conflict with a habitual impulse may be ineffective methods for studying ego depletion ([@B27]), especially computer-administered measures of executive functioning ([@B14]). Unfortunately, this includes the recent registered replication report involving a modification of the [@B40] procedure, whose outcome task simply asked participants to press a button to indicate whether each word has an "e" that is not adjacent to another vowel ([@B3]).

Further illustrating the adverse impact of questionable procedures on ego depletion results is the [@B7] study. That extension study purported to assess ego depletion at the end of six disparate activities, including two waiting periods and consumption of sweets in some conditions. The outcome measure was the operation span test of working memory, in which participants were asked to memorize 15 sets of words in blocks of two to five words. The need for impulse control in that task is unclear. The study also included the decision to "restrict data collection to a single semester (p. 3)," thereby reducing statistical power. All of these methodological choices made the results ambiguous, at best. Yet, that study was included in the [@B6] meta-analysis without any indication of its weaknesses or complexities. Other studies included in that meta-analysis sample may have had similar issues, which should have been disclosed through proper coding and analysis of methodological moderators.

Meta-analysts struggle with how to deal with null findings, and with good reason. Some null findings indicate highly competent work. These should count as strong evidence against the hypothesis. Others indicate less informative or competent work, including failures to match the procedures to the population, an inappropriate outcome measure, inconsistent experimenter behavior or other extraneous factors. These should not count, or not count as much, as relevant evidence. Research synthesists who disproportionately sample unvetted studies and do not code for methodological quality risk invalid meta-analytic results that mislead the field.

The Impact of New Investigators
===============================

One mixed blessing of a research area that is growing in popularity is the interest of new investigators. Some new investigators offer fresh perspectives and contribute insightful extensions or clarifications of established phenomena. Others wish only to bask in the reflected glory of a hot topic by executing an apparently quick and easy replication project. The latter researchers may try to perform replication studies by copying procedures verbatim from other labs, rather than calibrating them to their participant population. Or, they may use the smallest sample size to be found among the published studies and lack adequate statistical power for the reliability of their execution of the study. A sample size that is appropriate for a carefully run study may be insufficient if the study is run hastily and with errors in an effort to meet graduate program or personal deadlines. Although, an underpowered study can produce a spurious over-estimate of an effect ([@B5]), poor research design and execution, including inadequate power, tend to produce null effects.

Anyone who has served on university thesis committees can attest to the variability in the competence and commitment of new researchers. Nonetheless, a graduate committee may decide to accept weak and unsuccessful replication studies to fulfill degree requirements if the student appears to have learned from the mistakes. There often is little recognition that an error-laden student thesis or conference report may end up in a meta-analysis.

One consequence of a shift from rigorous pioneering work to imprecise student follow-ups would be a general decline in effect size over time. [@B6] provide data that allow us to determine that this may be happening with ego depletion. The studies used by [@B6] with later reporting dates have significantly lower effect sizes (*r* = -0.33, *p* \< 0.0001) and are less likely to be published (*r* = -0.30, *p* \< 0.001) than studies from earlier years^[2](#fn02){ref-type="fn"}^. This is consistent with our expectations that all research is not created equally and that replication studies, especially by novice investigators, may not be executed with same meticulousness as the original research. Our analyses also are consistent with a recent study that found that replications run by high-expertise teams, with 10 or more publications, produced effect sizes that were nearly twice as large as those obtained by low-expertise teams, in part due to wiser choices of the specific method to replicate ([@B4]).

Unpublished studies are (by definition) harder for a meta-analyst to find than published ones, and so samples of unpublished studies are likely to be haphazard. [@B6] relied heavily on a small group of new researchers who produced many unpublished and non-significant findings. The 50 unpublished effects in [@B6] Table 1 were attributed to just 20 first authors or teams, who were linked to an average of 2.50 studies each. In contrast, the 68 published effects were produced by 42 different first authors or discrete research teams, with each contributing an average of 1.62 studies each, which is a significant difference from the unpublished studies, χ^2^(61) = 114.72, *p* \< 0.001^[3](#fn03){ref-type="fn"}^. In addition, nearly two-thirds of the unpublished effects (32/50) were from theses or dissertations produced by just *[10]{.ul}* graduate students, averaging 3.2 studies each. One student was associated with *[10]{.ul}* and another student with *[7]{.ul}* unpublished studies in the dataset, which seems disproportionate. This raises the possibility that the results of a small number of unpublished graduate students were given substantially more weight per person in the [@B6] meta-analysis compared to the work of more successful investigators.

While the 64% rate of graduate student authorship of the unpublished [@B6] effects seems high, comparable figures for the published studies are lacking. Unfortunately, the student status of authors is not disclosed in most published reports. It is noteworthy, however, that the unpublished effects, which included conference presentations, had a mean of 1.48 authors compared to 2.96 authors for the published findings \[*F*(1,116) = 46.27, *p* \< 0.0001\]. The greater number of authors of published than unpublished studies raises the possibility that more care and professional attention were devoted to successful than unsuccessful research.

Novice investigators' shortcomings, such as failure to properly operationalize and pilot-test procedures, can have a disproportionate impact on meta-analytic results. There was a significant relation of source of study (unpublished thesis/dissertation; other unpublished report; published report) to sample size in [@B6] \[*F*(2,117) = 5.28, *p* = 0.0005\]. Of particular interest, the *k* = 32 unpublished theses and dissertations, which can be conclusively attributed to new investigators, had significantly smaller sample sizes than the *k* = 68 published studies \[*n* = 41.88 vs. 59.37, *t*(98) = 2.63, *p* = 0.01\], producing lower statistical power and less likelihood of a significant effect. Those unpublished theses and dissertations also had higher variance of the effect size estimates than the published studies \[*v* = 0.103 vs. 0.086, *t*(98) = 1.84, *p* = 0.03, one-tail\]. In light of such quality control questions in the unpublished literature, we sympathize with [@B22] decision to focus on published studies in their meta-analysis.

These issues should have been addressed by [@B6]. In a review of meta-analyses, [@B11] found that dissertations typically were statistically underpowered and had other methodological deficiencies. They concluded: "The uncritical inclusion of unpublished dissertation studies in meta-analyses should be discouraged. A more judicious decision would be to base inclusion in meta-analyses on study quality or, at a minimum, to present results for high- and low quality studies separately (p. 225)." The failure of [@B6] to follow this reasonable recommendation likely contributed to their more negative assessment of the self-control literature compared to [@B22].

The professional literature has an intentional "quality bias" in favor of studies with theoretical and methodological strength. Unpublished theses, dissertations and other studies with null results warrant scrutiny for weaknesses, rather than automatic inclusion in a meta-analysis as unfortunate victims of "publication bias." In light of the standing [@B11] recommendation, and other best practices standards, [@B6] failure to provide methodological codes or otherwise assess the research quality of the student work included in their meta-analysis must be regarded as a serious deficiency that should not be emulated by future meta-analysts.

Secondary Statistical Analysis and Interpretation of Results
============================================================

[@B6] conducted a series of secondary analyses to determine whether their *g* = 0.43 effect size estimate for depletion was exaggerated due to publication bias or other small study effects. Except for their last set of analyses using "Precision Effects" tests, described below, the [@B6] analyses were consistent in demonstrating the existence of a non-zero effect in this data set. Such outcomes are more supportive of the resource depletion model than the null hypothesis.

The Test for Excess Significance (TES; [@B30]) examines whether there are more significant effects than should be expected based on the statistical power of the studies in the database. If the number of significant studies exceeds the expected value, then missing studies are presumed to be attributable to publication bias or other causes. [@B6] estimate of power = 0.42 for the combined depletion studies (Table 5), for example, implies that only 50 of the 118 depletion effects (0.42 \* 118) in the dataset should be statistically significant; more are "excess." It also follows that if most of the 68 published effects in the present dataset are statistically significant \[which may not be the case, but [@B6] Table 1 lacks that information\], the logic of TES suggests that the population could contain as many as 94 negative or non-significant depletion studies. Because the dataset contains 50 unpublished effects, most of which may be non-significant, up to 44 studies could be presumed by TES to be "missing" due to publication bias, despite the authors' efforts to contact unpublished authors.

When TES was calculated based on the limits of the confidence intervals for the random-effects estimate, the range was seen as too large to be conclusive. Using random-effects meta-analysis estimates, no bias was suggested in four of the eight datasets (hand grip, possible anagrams, standardized tests, Stroop), but that possibility was raised about the other four tasks (food consumption, impossible puzzles, possible anagrams, and working memory). Yet, we question the wisdom of excluding most of the published literature, dividing the remainder into small categories, and then attempting to estimate if some significant effects are "excess" or some null studies are "missing." The TES finding of no such problems in four of the depletion paradigms contradicts [@B6] overall null conclusion.

Next, [@B6] tried the Trim and Fill method, which attempts to estimate the impact of "missing" studies based on asymmetries in the distribution of obtained results ([@B15]; [@B33]). The approach is based on the assumption that studies with low standard errors should approximate the true effect, and that studies with higher standard errors should be symmetrically distributed around the true effect. A greater number of confirming than disconfirming studies with moderate to high standard errors might be attributable to publication bias, with negative outcomes to seem to be "missing" and justifying the imputation of additional unsupportive data.

[@B6] decision to feature eight depletion procedures might be defended because procedural subsamples are more homogenous than the full sample that includes diverse procedures --- but their inclusion of methodologically questionable or deficient studies meant that the subsamples still had high heterogeneity. Trim and Fill is known to mistake heterogeneity for missing studies ([@B43]). The use of Trim and Fill imputed no data in four of the eight outcomes (food consumption, working memory, impossible anagrams and standardized tests). For the remaining four data sets, between 1 and 5 additional "studies" were imputed, with even more added to the heterogeneous combined sample. Although the Trim and Fill estimate suggested the Stroop outcome is non-significant, the other seven procedures remained significant. Thus, even with the imputation of *k* = 29 hypothetical cases, the *g* across the 8 conditions was 0.24, *p* \< 0.001, consistent with the validity of the resource depletion phenomenon in a variety of instantiations.

Then, [@B6] used the Funnel Plot Asymmetry Test (FAT), which was again designed to test for small study effects by contrasting the number of studies that were and were not significant in relation to the statistical power ([@B16]). [@B6] reported that there was no significant problem stemming from small study effects in five of the procedures: food consumption, impossible anagrams, possible anagrams, standardized tests, and working memory. Using the unusual standard of *p* \< 0.10, the FAT flagged three of the same datasets that raised questions in Trim and Fill analysis (hand grip, impossible puzzles, Stroop). These findings confirm that small study effects are not a threat to the validity of most operationalizations of the resource depletion effect.

Although the depletion effect survived these tests, a question should be raised about the appropriateness of the TES, Trim-and-Fill and FAT in this context. Each test operates like an inferential statistic by requiring a sample that offers a valid estimate of the effect size, standard error, power and number of significant effects, from which conclusions about the literature may be derived. Yet, it is not clear which assumptions must be met in order for a sample to be appropriate for such inferences (cf. [@B29]) or to what true population of studies a non-random sample of studies is presumed to refer. It seems that the more weak studies that are included in a meta-analytic sample, the lower the estimated effect size and statistical power, and the higher the estimated error, which leads TES, Trim-and-Fill and FAT to project the possibility of more studies in file drawers, even if such studies are non-existent.

It also should be reemphasized that statistical power is due, in large part, to the individual investigator's methodological decisions about sample size and his or her skill in producing high impact and low error results. Statistical power and error can be estimated from a dataset, but they are not an intrinsic attribute of a procedure or a phenomenon. That is also true of a portion of effect size estimates, as our Conclusion will explain. For such reasons, [@B34] regards the use of tests like TES to detect and correct for publication bias and small study effects to be "questionable at best and completely misleading at worst (p. 182)." Even so, it should be reemphasized that the TES, Trim-and-Fill and FAT analyses largely left the resource depletion effects standing, rather than provided support for the null hypothesis.

"Precision Effect" Tests Provide Inconclusive Results
=====================================================

After the depletion effect remained significant following several secondary analyses for publication bias and small study effects, [@B6] employed two new and highly untested tests in questionable ways. The Precision Effect Test (PET; [@B41]) models the relation of an estimated effect to the standard error. It uses the intercept of a weighted least squares (WLSs) regression model in which effect size estimates are regressed on the standard error of those estimates, weighted by the inverse of the variances. An alternate test from the same statisticians called Precision Effect Estimation with Standard Error (PEESE) employs the intercept from a similar model but uses variances instead of standard errors as the predictor. Thus, both methods use WLSs regression to look for relationships between effect sizes and errors (which are linked to sample sizes). Both methods attribute any obtained relationship between effect sizes and error to bias, and interpret the intercept of the regression model as an effect size estimate that has been corrected for bias. Those assumptions have not yet been strongly demonstrated or widely accepted.

The PET-PEESE procedures impose high penalties on studies with moderate to high standard errors. That can inappropriately reduce estimates of effect size when a high proportion of questionable or weak studies are included in the dataset. In addition, the accuracy and suitability of PET and PEESE for samples of less than 20 are unknown, because the PET-PEESE method was tested only on simulation data of sample sizes of 20 and 80. The developers of PET-PEESE expressed caution about its suitability for small samples: "The meta-regression sample size of 20 is...a rather small sample size for any regression estimate\...regression-based estimators may not be appropriate if only a very small number of comparable empirical estimates exist ([@B41], p. 66)." After running their simulations, the test developers confirmed that: "These meta-regression estimates do not perform quite as strongly when there are only 20 estimates available (p. 71)." Because seven of the eight of [@B6] depletion data sets have *k* \< 20 studies, with a mean of *k* = 14.75, there are grounds to believe that results based on PET-PEESE with those samples are unreliable.

After removing a supportive study that they considered to be an outlier, [@B6] report concerning their standardized test dataset that: "PET estimate (*b* = 0.60) and PEESE estimate (*b* = 0.46) of the depletion effect were both larger than the random-effects meta-analysis estimate (*g* = 0.30). In other words, the application of PET and PEESE to this data set actually provided increased estimates of the depletion effect (although these estimates were non-significant because WLS meta-regression models produce wider confidence intervals compared to random-effects meta-analysis) (p. 808)." So, PET and PEESE both indicate a medium effect size for strength depletion on standardized test performance. Other depletion outcomes were weaker, but the authors seem to encourage readers to accept the null hypothesis for depletion effects despite the fact that the PET-PEESE tests are unproven, have unusually wide confidence intervals, and were deployed on datasets that were as much as 40% smaller than those tested by the developers (without the readers being warned of that limitation). Such constraints seemed like undue obstacles for the depletion effect.

[@B6] also made the surprising suggestion that their PEESE results indicate an *inverse* relation between self-control effort and performance effect sizes on four procedures. They suggested that the relation is "positive...for impossible anagrams, impossible puzzles, and working memory...and negative--- contrary to the limited strength model ...for food consumption, hand grip, possible anagrams, and Stroop (p. 809)." First, all PEESE results were non-significant (Table 7), so the signs of the coefficients should have been regarded as due to chance and not interpreted. Second, PET and PEESE do not test the relation of depletion to performance, but instead are secondary regression analyses that model the relation of the effect size's variance or standard error to the magnitude of the effect size. Finally, unstable coefficients, including reversals of sign from the original correlations, are common problems when regression procedures are used on small or heterogeneous samples Small samples are less likely to meet statistical assumptions, such as normally distributed residuals. Indeed, [@B32] advised against regression analyses with less than 100 cases. Consequently, it is not surprising that artifacts emerged when [@B6] used PET and PEESE on their eight extremely small data sets (i.e., *k* = 12 to 21), or their heterogeneous *k* = 118 samples.

[@B6] were clear that: "We favor an interpretation of our findings that depends on the validity of the WLS meta-regression estimators PET and PEESE (p. 812)." Those analyses certainly offered the only basis for [@B6] to claim that the ego depletion effect could be zero. Yet, additional serious deficiencies involving PET-PEESE recently have been reported by [@B27], using an extensive series of simulations, indicating that the procedures underestimate real effects and are prone to fail to find true differences, especially by PET and especially with heterogeneous datasets. In short, [@B6] based their conclusions on new and untested statistical tests that might be ideal for research synthesists seeking to make nothing out of something --- but were highly questionable and probably inappropriate if one was seeking to ascertain the reality behind the data.

Conclusion
==========

[@B7],[@B8], [@B9]) have steadily argued against the strength depletion model, but [@B6] latest conclusion, that the true depletion effect is zero, is untenable. Their own broadest analysis yielded a supportive *g* = 0.43 in favor of the model, which is not much smaller than what [@B22] found using only published studies. The 76% of the [@B6] reports with a positive *g* for the depletion effect could be interpreted as persuasive evidence in support of the model.

To argue for a null effect, [@B6] excluded 80% of the extant literature and most of the published studies, including the bulk of significant findings in the [@B22] meta-analysis. They also coded their studies inadequately; overemphasized unpublished studies by graduate students who produced null results; conducted and over-interpreted a dubious set of mini-meta-analyses; and tried a barrage of questionable, sometimes unsuitable, statistical assumptions, and procedures. Even so, only the unproven PET-PEESE offered null effects for seven of the eight depletion paradigms.

[@B6] subtitle: "Self-Control Does Not Seem to Rely on a Limited Resource" conveys acceptance of the null hypothesis. Yet, [@B38] emphasized three criteria that should be met before the null hypothesis is accepted: (1) maximize statistical power (rather than minimizing it by including deficient studies and dividing studies into small categories with low power); (2) determine *a priori* what would count as meaningful effect (rather than relying on dichotomous significance testing); and (3) conduct a mixed effects meta-analysis that employs a range of thoughtfully chosen moderators to determine when effects can be found and when they cannot (rather than excluding many important moderators from the meta-analysis). [@B6] argued for the acceptance of null conclusions while failing to meet any of those criteria.

One of the central aims of meta-analysis is to diminish the influence of researcher biases and increase transparency in order to estimate the true validity and strength of an effect. Unfortunately, the literature has taken on a tone that seems unduly suspicious both of the published literature and of investigator intentions. The unpleasant term "p-hacking" refers to a spectrum of research behaviors or choices that result in unwarranted significant findings ([@B39]). Of course, the enthusiastic experimenter should not stop an experiment just when a significant result is found, conduct multiple statistical analyses in hopes that one will be significant, or conduct multiple studies until one is significant while withholding the non-significant studies from the report ([@B38]). Now, however, research synthesists are encouraged to suspect that the literature is replete with Type I errors and conduct tests during meta-analyses to detect p-hacking, thereby implying researcher misconduct.

Yet, it is unreasonable to suggest that primary investigators are likely to be biased whereas research synthesists can safely be presumed to be impartial and immune from any confirmation bias. Instead, we suggest that the field should be equally concerned about both p-hacking and what might be called "p-bashing," which creates Type II errors. P-bashing occurs when a skeptical research synthesist deliberately or unconsciously seeks to obtain small or non-significant effects sizes to overturn an established paradigm. This outcome can be obtained through, for example, the exclusion in a meta-analytic sample of a high proportion of successful studies, the inclusion of a high proportion of deficient studies, the use of questionable secondary analyses with unmet statistical assumptions that diminish effect size and the inclusion of secondary analysis of that reduce effect sizes while omitting secondary analyses that boost them (e.g., correction for attenuation, [@B25]).

We do not know [@B6] intentions and do not accuse them of p-bashing. On the contrary, we emphasize the broader point that the field's approach to research results that are challenging to replicate should be mindful of the baby while throwing out the dirty bathwater. We suggest that methodological rigor and impartiality mandates comparable consideration and control of Type II errors as of Type I errors in both meta-analyses and replications; both p-bashing and p-hacking are incommensurate with scientific progress.

We suggest that a major goal of meta-analysts should be clarification of the moderators of when effects are reliably obtained, and when they are not. With one of the few moderators tested, [@B6] found no advantage from being linked to the laboratories of Baumeister, Tice, and their students; other careful investigators produce effects of similar magnitude. Thoughtful readers might wonder why diverse researchers have conducted over 600 studies, and continue to do so, if there is no depletion effect. If there were 100s of methodologically valid but unsuccessful studies, their authors would not have been silent. Even before the widespread use of meta-analysis, the "invisible college" promptly recognized and abandoned wrong hypotheses and unworkable methods (cf. [@B36]).

More broadly, the underlying assumption that there is a single "true" effect size for a phenomenon that is influenced by multiple variables, such as ego depletion, contains some elements of absurdity. Not only do the depletion manipulations, contexts and outcome measures vary considerably, but depletion itself occurs in varying degrees. In fact, some researchers have explicitly sought to compare mild vs. severe levels of depletion (e.g., [@B45]), similar to the impact of varying degrees of physical tiredness ([@B17]). If we asked "How much more slowly does someone run a mile when tired than when fresh?" a thoughtful initial response should be more along the lines of "How tired?" rather than "precisely 20% slower." The fact that meta-analyses found heterogeneous effect sizes for different depletion paradigms is not a weakness but instead is perfectly consistent with this analysis.

There doubtless is much else still to learn about ego depletion and self-control. [@B6] might have made a positive contribution to the field by focusing on when and why some studies, manipulations and measures were better or worse for demonstrating the depletion effect. The most regrettable aspect of [@B6] report is that it may discourage research on what may be a true effect, with the potential for important theoretical implications and practical applications. Our goal in pointing out the many questionable elements of the [@B6] approach is to encourage continuing and ever-better thinking, research, and meta-analyses.
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Dates, authorship and other information on the studies used in [@B6] was drawn from a file posted at <http://supp.apa.org/psycarticles/supplemental/xge0000083/xge0000083_supp.html.>

Schmiechel published four studies from his dissertation. [@B6] included them, plus a fifth study that he chose not to publish, so he has effects in both the published and unpublished groups.
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